| Mick James focuses on the ongoing saga that is the Connecting for Health project and asks whether the consultancies involved are really to blame? Could it be that some of the largest consulting firms on the planet were brow-beaten into being suppliers for the ill-fated project... |
| Connecting for Health – a project turned sour? |
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| | By Mick James
I’d sort of promised
myself to stop writing
about Connecting for
Health, but I just can’t
tear my eyes away.
Latest revelations
include a story from
Computer Weekly that
the National Audit
Office's report was
changed before
publication to present
the programme in a more
positive light. Kudos to
Weekly for digging up
the text, but shouldn’t
some credence have been
given to the notion that
the final draft was an
accurate reflection of
the NAO’s final verdict,
rather than immediately
branding it a “cover
up...which reads as if
it were a defence of the
programme composed by
the Department of
Health”.
If I were the NAO I
would immediately take
umbrage at this stain on
my honour and refuse to
leave the dressing room.
Not that it makes much
difference – the final
report, now castigated
as sycophantic, was
construed in the most
negative terms anyway.
More serious is the
continuing financial
uncertainty surrounding
iSoft, one of the major
sub-contractors. No-one
has made the case that
this is in some way the | |
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| | we’re missing the wider
picture. This is not
only the biggest IT
project this country has
ever attempted, but also
a completely
groundbreaking piece of
procurement. That’s a
rather volatile
combination, but a
fascinating one.
If they could only
stop invading foreign
countries, this
Government’s reputation
would stand or fall by
its contribution to the
reform and
revitalisation of public
services. Connecting for
Health is one of the
biggest investments in
that project and
represents a massive
leap of faith in the
idea that the health
service can be seriously
improved by information
technology. I find that
rather touching. And
what, really are the
alternatives?
Personally, I feel as if
I have been transformed
into something of a
demi-god just by the
advent of the internet
(and would be worshipped
as such if everyone else
hadn’t got it). Were we
really going to sit back
and let this
transforming force do
wonders for Tesco’s but
not our hospitals?
Unfortunately for
this dream, the | |
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| | Government has a pretty
unenviable record when
it comes to procuring
IT. It’s said to be the
mark of lunacy if you
keep doing the same
thing and expecting
different results. So
this time the
procurement was
conducted on a radically
different and much more
confrontational and
competitive basis. The
stringent terms and high
level of risk made so
many contractors walk
away that one has to
wonder on what basis the
remaining players stayed
in the game.
I suspect some may
have had very little
choice – to have walked
away from a government
IT project of such a
scale, and such a major
part of health IT
spending may have been
too damaging to the
image and reputation of
some of the firms
involved.
Did the Government
bank on this, and
effectively blackmail
its own suppliers? I’d
hate to say so
definitely but it’s
beginning to look a
little bit like it. And
in that case, is this
the way to do
procurement? It might be
a vote winner to build
government
infrastructure with the | |
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| | wealth of consultancy
shareholders and
partners, but I’m not
sure if it’s a recipe
for a long-term healthy
relationship between the
Government and its
suppliers. One wonders
on what terms these
firms will engage with
HMG in future? The
Government may think it
has the whip hand, but
the number of firms that
can successfully carry
out projects on this
scale is very small
indeed. What if none of
them want to play next
time?
Of course, the
question of how exactly
you do procure
infrastructure is still
unresolved. Most of the
companies that
originally built our
canals and railways went
bust, and we didn’t even
get the Channel Tunnel
onto a stable footing.
In the meantime, we
should be getting a
massive piece of
infrastructure on the
cheap, whether we want
it or not. It may not be
on time, but at least it
won’t be haemorrhaging
money. Perhaps we should
all shut up now until
it’s finished.
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| | fault of either the NHS
or its head contractors,
but the story seems to
keep getting thrown into
the mix as if to
illustrate the general
rottenness of all things
to do with IT and
government.
As further
illustration of the
negative mindset
surrounding this
project, even the fact
that BT has only been
paid a miserable million
quid so far is being
seen as a bad thing.
Of course, there are
serious questions to be
raised about Connecting
for Health. I’m not a
fan of big, centralised
computer projects (or
big, centralised
anything for that
matter), and find the
British Computer
Society’s suggestion
that a distributed
architecture would work
better intriguing, as
well as the suggestion
(apparently omitted from
the final NAO report)
that such systems work
well in other countries.
But I still think | |
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